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1 For consistency with reporting practices of the UNFCCC and data from the scientific literature, estimates of different greenhouse gas emissions in this report are 
weighted using Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (Schimel et al., 1996). GWPs have been regularly updated in successive 
IPCC assessment reports and in the scientific literature.
2 Updated greenhouse gas emissions estimates as shown in Figure 2.1, based on Olivier et al. (2013), JRC/PBL (2012) as described in Appendix 2-A.
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Over the past few years rapid progress has 
been made in understanding the impacts of 
greenhouse gas emissions on global warming. This 
understanding has also made it possible to better 
estimate the levels of global emissions consistent 
with global temperature increase limits, such as 
1.5 °C and 2 °C.
This chapter first reviews estimates of recent 
global emission levels and trends; then examines 
business-as-usual emission levels that would 
theoretically be reached if no further action were 
taken to reduce emissions. Finally, it presents the 
levels of emissions that are consistent with limits 
to global temperature increases.
2 .1  Current global emission 
levels
Different data sources give different estimates 
of global greenhouse gas emissions for 2010 
(JRC/PBL, 2012; Blanco et al. 2014). The IPCC’s AR5 
gives a median estimate of 49 gigatonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (Gt CO
2
e; 49±4.5 range, with a 
5–95 per cent confidence interval)1. A recent update 
of trends in global emission levels (Figure 2.1) gives 
a median estimate of 51 Gt CO
2
e2. In this report 
(specifically, in Chapters 2 and 3) the AR5 value of 
49 Gt CO
2
e is used.
Figure 2.1 shows emission levels by major 
economic groupings for the period 1970–2012. 
Note that, due to different methodologies and 
data sources, these values may differ from data 
derived from national inventory submissions and 
communications. The general regional trends over 
recent years were described in last year’s report. 
For 2010–2012, these preliminary estimates 
indicate that global emissions grew by an average 
of 3 per cent per year, to 53 and 54 Gt CO
2
e in 2011 
and 2012, respectively (JRC/PBL, 2012; Olivier et 
al., 2013; Appendix 2-A). Trends varied from an 
increase of 6 per cent in the G20 countries that are 
not members of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), to a 
decline of 1 and 2 per cent, respectively, in OECD 
Europe and OECD North America. Over the last 
decade, per person emissions also increased in 
non-OECD G20 countries and decreased in OECD 
Europe and OECD North America.
4EMISSIONS GAP REPORT   A UNEP SynthesischApter 2
What emission levels will comply with temperature limits?
Least developed countries
Other industrialized countries
OECD Europe
Other developing countries
OECD Pacific
OECD North America
Bunkers
Non-OECD G20
OECD Latin America
40
20
10
0
30
60
50
G
lo
ba
l a
nn
ua
l g
re
en
ho
us
e 
ga
s e
m
is
si
on
s (
G
t C
O
2e
)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Non-OECD G20
OECD North America
Other industrialized countries
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
Least developed countries
OECD Latin America
Other developing countries
20
10
5
0
15
30
25
G
lo
ba
l a
nn
ua
l g
re
en
ho
us
e 
ga
s e
m
is
si
on
s p
er
 p
er
so
n 
(t
 C
O
2e
)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 2 .1: Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 1970-2012 by major economic grouping. Total 
emissions (top) and per person emissions (bottom).
Notes: Data refer to the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (see Footnote 6 for a listing of these 
gases). Note that emissions for 2011 and 2012 were extrapolated as described in Appendix 2-A. Data are plotted using global 
warming potential values from IPCC Second Assessment Report.
Sources: EDGAR 4.3 (JRC/PBL 2014) and GFED land-use emissions as used in AR5.
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Carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and 
cement production is the largest contributor to 
total greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions 
grew by about 2.4 per cent per year averaged over 
2011 and 2012, and by 2.0 per cent in 20133. This 
represents a slowing of the 2.7 per cent per year 
rate of growth experienced over the preceding 
decade. At the global level, these emissions are 
fairly well estimated, within a range of ±8 per cent 
(5–95 per cent confidence interval; Andres et al., 
2012). Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions are 
also a useful indicator of climate impact and the 
most recent trends, to 2010, are reviewed in AR5 
(Blanco et al., 2014).
Methane is the second largest greenhouse gas, 
and its apparent importance has increased 
because estimates of its global warming potential 
have increased from 21 to 284. Methane’s share 
of total greenhouse gas emissions increases from 
16 per cent to 20 per cent if the higher estimate 
of GWP is used (Edenhofer et al., 2014). The 
absolute value and trends in methane emissions 
are more uncertain (around ±20 per cent) than 
estimates of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion and cement production (Blanco 
et al., 2014). This uncertainty is apparent in the 
discrepancy between emission estimates based 
on emission inventories versus atmospheric 
measurements. While global (anthropogenic) 
methane emission levels have been steadily 
increasing over the last three decades according to 
global emission inventories, they have been stable 
ssor decreasing based on an inversion analysis of 
methane concentration trends in the atmosphere 
(Kirschke et al., 2013). Since 2006, however, both 
ways of estimating anthropogenic methane 
emissions indicate that global emissions have 
been increasing.
2 .2  Business-as-usual 
emission levels
To track the progress of additional targeted 
climate policies, it is useful to have a reference 
point for estimating emission levels in the absence 
of additional policies. When these reference points 
are presented over a series of future years, they 
are called business-as-usual (BaU) scenarios. This 
part of the report presents BaU scenarios of global 
greenhouse gas emissions5 up to 2050.
The BaU scenarios shown here are based on an 
extrapolation of current economic, social and 
technological trends. They only take into account 
climate policies implemented up to around 
2005–20106 (i.e. recent country pledges and policies 
are not considered) and therefore serve as a reference 
point for what would happen to emissions if planned 
climate mitigation policies were not implemented.
The BaU scenarios presented here draw on a much 
larger and more diverse ensemble of scenarios 
than previously available. Since the 2013 report, 
a number of model inter-comparison projects 
have reported their findings7, on which the 
recently published AR5 drew heavily. In fact, a 
novel product of the AR5 exercise is an interactive 
scenario database containing all pathways 
that were reviewed, both BaU and greenhouse 
gas mitigation scenarios, including thorough 
explanations of their scenario designs and policy 
assumptions8. Nearly 1 200 scenarios populate 
the AR5 Database, and about 250 of these can be 
____________________ 
3 The average of estimates from JRC/PBL (2014) and Le Quéré et al. (2014).
4 This is the 10-year global warming potential (please refer to the glossary for a definition). The earlier estimate of 21 is from Schimel et al. (1996) and the new 
estimate of 28 is from the IPCC AR5 based on new physical science understanding from Myhre et al. (2013).
5 Unless otherwise noted, greenhouse gas emissions or total greenhouse gas emissions refers to the sum of the six greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol 
(CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs and SF
6
). It includes emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the energy and industry sectors, as well as from land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF).
6 Different models use different base years for their internal calibration.
7 Examples include AMPERE (Riahi et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a), EMF27 (Kriegler et al., 2014b), LIMITS (Kriegler et al., 2013; Tavoni et al., 2013), and RoSE (Luderer 
et al., 2013a).
8 The IPCC WG III AR5 Scenario Database can be accessed at: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/
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considered BaU ones according to the definition 
applied here9. This section of the report focuses on 
a subset of 191 scenarios, produced by 31 different 
models that take emissions of all Kyoto gases10 into 
account and have full global and sectoral coverage.
According to this large ensemble of scenarios, 
in the absence of additional policies to reduce 
greenhouse gases, global emissions are 
projected to rise to 59 Gt CO
2
e per year (range: 
57–61 Gt CO
2
e/yr)11 by 2020. They are likely 
to continue climbing to 87 Gt CO
2
e per year 
(range: 75–92 Gt CO
2
e/yr) by 2050, equivalent 
to a 70 per cent increase relative to 2010 
(Figure 2.2). Such steep upward trajectories are 
consistent with global average temperature 
levels that are around 4 °C warmer in the year 
2100 than the period 1850–1900. The likelihood 
of staying below 2 °C warming is extremely 
small in this case (Table 6.3 of IPCC WGIII AR5).
The uncertainty ranges of the BaU emissions 
projections shown in Figure 2.2 reflect different 
interpretations of economic, social and tech-
nological trends. For example, scenarios that 
are optimistic about fossils fuels and/or are 
pessimistic about renewable or nuclear energy 
tend to have emissions near the top of the range. 
By contrast, scenarios that assume slower growth 
of the economy and/or energy demand, relative 
to economic activity, tend to have emissions at 
the lower part of the range. Although the 
differences between scenarios are fairly minor 
in the short- term (2020), they become more 
pronounced by 2030.
2 .3 Global emission levels 
linked with global warming limits
2 .3 .1 Introduction
As noted above, countries have agreed to limit 
global warming to 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
levels, and to consider lowering that limit to 
1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2010). Findings reported here 
and elsewhere, have made it clear that society 
must limit emissions if it is to stay within its own 
global warming limits. This raises some important 
questions which are dealt with in this section:
- What is the level of cumulative greenhouse gas 
emissions consistent with limiting warming to 
below 1.5 °C or 2 °C?
- How can this budget of cumulative emissions 
be distributed over time? Under these 
budgetary constraints, when are global carbon 
dioxide emissions expected to reach zero? And 
how does this translate into a path for total 
greenhouse gases over time?
- What are the implications of not increasing 
climate mitigation efforts significantly beyond 
their current levels? 
To address these and other questions, this 
section draws on the scenarios compiled by AR5 
grouped according to their temperature outcomes 
(Appendix 2-D)12.
____________________
9 Because the different scenarios have different base year (2010) estimates for emissions (most likely resulting from non-standardized data sources and conversion 
methodologies across models), the current analysis normalizes all 2010 emissions to the same value. An estimate of 49 Gt CO
2
e per year is used for doing this 
because that was the best available value at the time the models were running scenarios for the IPCC AR5 process. Future emissions growth in each scenario is 
then indexed to this common base-year value. The emission pathways reported in this section have all been indexed in this way. For the non-indexed emission 
pathways, including the 2010 ranges, see Appendix 2-B. It should be noted, however, that these adjustments via base-year indexing have only a small effect on 
the spread of future emissions: a variety of other factors are at play. To be sure, the indexing methodology, as applied here, leads to slight increases in emissions 
levels in 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 relative to the raw scenario data, primarily because the majority of models/scenarios in the IPCC AR5-assessed literature use 
lower values for 2010 emissions. Note that previous studies of baseline emissions projections, for example Blanford et al. (2012), have utilized similar normalizing/
indexing methodologies to control for different base-year starting points across models.
10 For list of Kyoto gases, see Footnote 5.
11 Unless otherwise stated, all ranges in this and other sections of the report are expressed as 20th–80th percentiles.
12 The IPCC AR5 Working Group III Contribution grouped scenarios based on their resulting carbon dioxide-equivalent concentrations in 2100. This choice allows for 
a direct comparison with the four representative concentration pathways (RCPs) that were used by the other working groups of the IPCC AR5. In contrast, the main 
focus of this report is the temperature outcome of emission scenarios. Therefore, the IPCC scenarios are re-grouped based on their probabilities of limiting warming 
to below specific temperature levels. Appendix 2-D provides a detailed comparison of the results of this report and the findings of the IPCC AR5.
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Figure 2 .2: Global greenhouse gas emissions in business-as-usual scenarios 
Notes: Consistent with IPCC WG III AR5 Chapter 6, carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions are constructed using GWPs over a 
100-year time horizon derived from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (see Annex II.9.1 for the GWP values of the different 
greenhouse gases). Business-as-usual scenarios imply an absence of climate mitigation policies after the 2005–2010 period (such 
as recent country pledges and policies). Data refer to the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol 
(see Footnote 5 for a listing of these gases.) Historic data are derived from JRC/PBL (2012) and IEA (2012). Future projections come 
from the IPCC WG III AR5 Scenario Database and are based on estimates from a large number of models. FF&I stands for emissions 
from fossil fuels combustion in the energy and industry sectors. LULUCF stands for emissions from land use, land-use change and 
forestry. The range of business-as-usual estimates for 2020 are not the same as in Figure 3.1. This is explained in Footnote 10 in 
Chapter 3. Scenario results are shown as ranges:  20th–80th percentile spread (colored), full extremes (light box), median in bold.
2 .3 .2 Geophysical requirements for limiting 
warming to below 1 .5 °C and 2 °C
Working Group I of the IPCC (IPCC, 2013) refined 
previous estimates of the sensitivity of the climate 
system to increased greenhouse gas emissions. In 
doing so it assessed a new metric for expressing 
this sensitivity – the transient climate response 
to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE). Using 
the TCRE concept, Working Group I showed that 
global mean temperature increases are almost 
directly proportional to cumulative carbon dioxide 
emissions since the pre-industrial period. This 
leads to the important conclusion that there is a 
maximum amount of carbon dioxide emissions, or 
budget that can be discharged to the atmosphere 
over time if society wishes to stay within a 2 °C or 
other global warming limit. Both Working Group 
I and III of AR5 provide carbon dioxide emission 
budgets in line with various temperature levels 
(Box 2.1). Because carbon dioxide plays a dominant 
role in determining long-term warming, we first 
focus on carbon dioxide emissions and later on 
total greenhouse gas emissions.
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Box 2 .1: IPCC AR5 and carbon dioxide emission budgets 
Figure B.2.1 (based on Figure SPM.10 of (IPCC, 2013) illustrates how cumulative carbon dioxide emissions are 
influenced by various factors. If we hypothetically assume that carbon dioxide is the only greenhouse gas affecting 
global temperature and the response of temperature to cumulative carbon dioxide emissions is constant and 
well known, then the relationship between global warming and emissions would be represented by a straight 
line (Panel A). However, since the response is not perfectly known, it has an uncertainty range as illustrated by the 
grey areas in Panels B, C, and D. Staying below a given temperature limit with a higher probability – for example 
very likely compared to likely – implies a smaller carbon dioxide budget (Panel B). Furthermore, lowering the 
temperature limit, say, from 2 °C to 1.5 °C, also implies a smaller budget (panel C). Finally, taking into account the 
additional global warming caused by non-carbon dioxide emissions at the time when global temperature peaks 
also reduces the emissions budget, and adds additional uncertainties as expressed by the larger light-orange 
area in Panel D.
Figure B .2 .1: How the transient climate response is influenced by various factors 
Source: adapted from Knutti and Rogelj (in review). 
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within the budget of cumulative emissions (Figure 
2.3, right-hand panel, where linearly declining 
emissions become zero between 2045 and 2075). 
All in all, this means that annual emissions must 
ultimately decline, and if they are high now they 
will have to decline faster later to stay within the 
budget. Conversely, if annual emissions are lower 
at the beginning of the budget period, they can 
be somewhat higher at a later time. This, however, 
implies a trade-off between earlier and later 
mitigation costs, and between risks linked to the 
different strategies (Section 2.3.4).
At present, there is still uncertainty around the 
TCRE estimates which needs to be factored into 
discussions of future emission pathways. Here 
this uncertainty is taken into account by grouping 
scenarios according to their probability to limit 
warming to below a given temperature limit. A 
likely chance as used here denotes a greater than 66 
per cent probability (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) and 
a medium chance a probability of 50–66 per cent.
The idea of a carbon dioxide emissions budget 
implies that annual emissions at some point in 
time become zero or negative in order to stay 
As to the size of the carbon dioxide emissions budget, Working Group I of the IPCC indicated – again for the 
hypothetical case that carbon dioxide would be the only anthropogenic greenhouse gas – that there was a 
greater than 66 per cent chance that the 2 °C limit could be maintained if cumulative carbon dioxide emissions 
from around 1860–1880 to some point in the future could be held to 3 670 Gt CO
2
 or less. For a greater than 
50 per cent chance, this figure is 4 440 Gt CO
2
 and for a 33 per cent chance it is 5 760 Gt CO
2
. Taking into account 
non-carbon dioxide emissions, these budgets are smaller.
As a reference point, by year 2011 a total of 1 890 Gt CO
2
 (1 630–2 150, 95 per cent confidence range) had already 
been emitted into the atmosphere by human activities. Hence a large share of the carbon dioxide emissions 
budget for limiting global warming to 2 °C has already been used up.
IPCC Working Group III also provided information on carbon dioxide emission budgets as part of their analyses 
of mitigation scenarios (Clarke et al., 2014). For scenarios with a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit, 
they found that cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from 2011 until 2050 are in the range of 550–1 300 Gt CO
2
 
and from 2011 until 2100 in the range of 630–1 180 Gt CO
2
. These figures are broadly consistent with the results 
from Working Group I. However, the IPCC WGIII assessment, by further exploring the uncertainty in pathways 
and including a wide range of non-carbon dioxide forcing, has consistently lowered the estimates of carbon 
dioxide emission budgets in line with 2 °C as compared to those from WGI, which were based on the hypothetical 
assumption that carbon dioxide is the only anthropogenic greenhouse gas.
Finally, based on multi-model results, the IPCC Synthesis Report stated that likely limiting total human-induced 
warming (accounting for both CO
2
 and other human influences on climate) to less than 2 °C relative to the period 
1861–1880 would require total CO
2
 emissions from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to be limited to about 
2 900 Gt CO
2
 when accounting for non-CO
2
 forcing as in the RCP2.6 scenario, with a range of 2 550–3 150 Gt CO
2
 
arising from variations in non-CO
2
 climate drivers. About 1 900 (1 650 to 2 150, 90 per cent range) Gt CO
2
 were 
emitted by 2011, leaving about 1 000 Gt CO
2 
to be consistent with the 2°C objective.
Importantly, some non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases such as methane and tropospheric ozone have a much 
shorter residence time in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide or nitrous oxide, and are therefore sometimes 
called short-lived climate pollutants/forcers. Because of their shorter time in the atmosphere, the annual 
emissions of these substances have a bigger impact on temperature than their cumulative emissions (Solomon 
et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2012).
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Over a longer period of time the carbon dioxide 
emissions budget cannot be exhausted if the goal 
is to stay within a particular temperature limit. 
It can be temporarily exhausted but then the 
accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
must be compensated by net negative carbon 
dioxide emissions – emissions that are actively 
removed from the atmosphere and sequestered. 
Note, the feasibility of achieving global negative 
emissions is uncertain and associated with a host 
of other risks (Fuss et al., 2014).
The left-hand panels of Figure 2.3 illustrate the 
temporal trade-offs in carbon dioxide emission 
mitigation. In all three examples emissions decline 
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Figure 2 .3: Illustration of carbon dioxide emission budgets in line with limiting warming to 2°C
The left hand panels show three conceptual examples that distribute the remaining emissions budget over the 21st century. 
Note that while Example C requires net negative global emissions to stay within the budget, scenarios in the other examples 
might also make use of negative emissions to a lesser extent if it helps facilitate the required emissions reductions. The examples 
are explained in the text. The right hand panel shows annual carbon dioxide emissions (black line) over time from Le Quéré et 
al. (2013). The coloured areas under the curves show the cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from 2010 onwards. The purple-
coloured area denotes cumulative carbon dioxide emissions with a likely (66 per cent) chance of limiting warming to below 
2 °C, including uncertainty. In this report, these cumulative emissions are called the carbon dioxide emissions budget. The grey-
coloured area denotes the cumulative carbon dioxide emissions projected under business-as-usual scenarios which assume no 
climate policies (likewise including uncertainty). The grey area, cumulative emissions under business-as-usual, is clearly larger 
than the blue area, the carbon dioxide emissions budget for staying within 2 °C. Cumulative emissions are taken from the WGIII 
assessment of the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014). 
significantly during the first half of this century, 
but with important variations. In Example B, action 
is taken early to reduce emissions, which means 
that emissions are lower in the first period as 
compared to Example A. Since the carbon dioxide 
emissions budget is not used up as quickly in 
Example B, it has higher emissions in the second 
half of the century than Example A. Meanwhile, in 
Example C, action is delayed at the beginning of 
the period and initial emissions are higher than 
in Examples A or B. To stay within the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget, Example C requires 
sharp emission reductions immediately afterwards 
and net negative emissions in the second half of 
this century.
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____________________
13 Hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and available at: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/
14 These are cost optimal scenarios in that they take advantage of the lowest cost mitigation options available.
These and other trade-offs related to staying 
within the emissions budget are discussed in 
Section 2.3.4.
2 .3 .3 Carbon dioxide emissions budgets, 
greenhouse gas emissions and 
temperature limits
We have seen above that it is necessary to stay 
within a specific carbon dioxide emissions budget 
to keep warming below 2 °C or some other global 
warming limit. How then can these budgets be 
spread out over time? To answer this question, 
the following sections examine scenarios from 
integrated assessment models. These models take 
into account changes in the energy system and 
other important societal processes, and therefore 
help identify economically and technologically 
feasible emission reduction rates and emission 
pathways. The scenarios are taken from the IPCC 
WGIII AR5 scenario database13 (Box 2.2).
As mentioned above, science has convincingly 
established the proportional relationship between 
global temperature increases and cumulative 
carbon dioxide emissions. Hence we first focus 
on carbon dioxide emissions and then report 
findings on carbon dioxide plus non-carbon 
dioxide emissions.
The discussion of carbon dioxide emission budgets 
is structured according to two dimensions. The first 
divides scenarios according to the year in which 
concerted emission reductions14 begin – either 
2010 or 2020:
- Least-cost 2010 scenarios: the scenarios in 
this subset are of the same kind analysed in 
previous gap reports. These are scenarios with a 
likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit and 
that follow a least-cost emissions pathway with 
stringent reductions after 2010. A least-cost 
emission pathway is one that takes advantage of 
lowest cost options for emission reductions and 
minimizes total costs of reduction up to 2100.
- Least-cost 2020 scenarios: this subset of 
scenarios also has a likely chance of staying 
within the 2 °C limit. But they depart from the 
least-cost 2010 scenarios by assuming that 
emission reductions are only modest up to 
2020, that pledges are fully implemented in 
2020, and that a least-cost emissions pathway 
with rapid reductions is only followed after 
2020.  These are often called delayed action 
or later action scenarios because they begin 
their least-cost pathway in 2020 rather than 
2010. (Modest here means that the speed of 
emission reductions up to 2020 is significantly 
slower than in the least-cost 2010 scenarios, 
and emissions actually increase until 2020).
It is important to note that the current pathway of 
global emissions is so far more consistent with the 
least-cost 2020 scenarios than the least-cost 2010 
scenarios. First of all, emissions in recent years have 
been higher than in the least-cost 2010 scenarios 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2014). Second, the least-
cost 2020 scenarios seem to be more in 
accord with current projections of emissions for 
2020.  Global emissions in 2020 are projected 
to be 52–54 Gt CO
2
e under various pledge cases 
(Chapter 3). Least- cost 2020 scenarios are close to 
this range with 50–53 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, while least-
cost 2010 scenarios are much lower with a range of 
41-47 Gt CO
2
e in 2020. 
The second dimension by which the discussion is 
structured divides scenarios according to whether 
or not they rely on net negative carbon dioxide 
emissions from the energy and industrial sectors 
in order to stay within the emissions budget. 
As noted earlier, net negative global emissions 
are required in some scenarios to compensate 
for having temporarily exceeded the emissions 
budget or to facilitate a peak and decline in global 
12
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Box 2 .2: Data and methodology
Findings in this report are based on an analysis of emission scenarios available in the IPCC AR5 Working Group 
III scenario database, hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and available at: https://
secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/. We use the original data for carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel 
and industry, total carbon dioxide emissions, and total global greenhouse gas emissions, defined in this report 
as the gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. Non-carbon dioxide gases are reported in units of billion tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent per year (Gt CO
2
e/yr), and are computed from the 100-year global warming potentials 
as specified by UNFCCC (2002).
Not included in the analysis is the recently added greenhouse gas, nitrogen trifluoride (NF
3
). Contributions to 
global temperature increase of the air pollutants sulphur dioxide, black carbon, organic carbon and tropospheric 
ozone with its precursors are included in the same way as in the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment. Many air-pollutant 
species have a common source, and some cool the atmosphere while others warm it. Hence, the cooling or 
warming effect of reducing these pollutants will depend on the precise mixture that is being reduced. While 
the Copenhagen Accord pledges do not target these species, integrated assessment models provide trends of 
air-pollutant emissions consistent with the overall changes in the energy system. In the scenarios analysed in 
this chapter, air pollutants thus are assumed to change in accordance with changes in carbon dioxide emissions.
Data for determining the probability of scenarios staying within 1.5 °C and 2 °C limits were taken from the IPCC 
AR5 scenario database. These data were computed with the probabilistic carbon-cycle and climate model 
MAGICC (Meinshausen et al., 2011a; Meinshausen et al., 2011b) in a setup that closely simulates the global 
temperature response to greenhouse gas emissions of the most complex climate models (Rogelj et al., 2012). 
This setup is in line with the most recent Working Group I assessment (Jones et al., 2013) and takes into account 
recent conjectures about a lower climate sensitivity (Rogelj et al., 2014). While this approach provides a single 
consistent framework for the assessment of temperature outcomes, the probabilities reported here depend on 
this particular framework and do not take into account uncertainty about the model structure. Temperature 
increase is computed relative to the 1850–1900 period, which is referred to as pre-industrial levels.
For the analyses in this chapter, we focus on scenarios that limit warming to below 2 °C by the end of the 21st 
century; and scenarios that limit warming below 1.5 °C by the end of the 21st century. Note that scenarios that 
stay within the 2 °C limit up to 2100, but also have increasing temperatures during that year, might still exceed 
2 °C in the next century. This analysis further uses methodologies described in the literature (Rogelj et al., 2011).
warming. Also as noted above, the feasibility of 
deploying large-scale technologies for global net 
negative carbon dioxide emissions is uncertain 
(Fuss et al., 2014; Box 2.3). Hence, it is important to 
investigate if negative emissions can be avoided15.
Constraints on global carbon dioxide emissions 
for limiting warming to below 2 °C
The analysis of scenarios has led to the following 
findings:
____________________
15 It is worth noting that even some scenarios that do not achieve net negative global carbon dioxide emissions do assume that negative emissions technologies 
(such as bio-energy in combination with carbon-capture and storage (BECCS)) are used to partly offset positive emissions. Furthermore, the land-use and forestry 
sector (not accounted for in energy and industry-related carbon dioxide emissions) can also contribute to reaching global net negative carbon dioxide emissions, 
for example, through afforestation. Scenarios are grouped based on their energy and industry-related emissions only, because the main technological uncertainties 
surrounding negative emissions (related to BECCS) are reflected most in these sectors.
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1. Carbon neutrality is reached around 2065 
(range: 2055–2070) under the subset of least-
cost 2020 scenarios, which – as noted above 
– may be more consistent with the current 
pathway of emissions up to 2020 than other 
scenario subsets. Here carbon neutrality means 
that carbon dioxide emissions16 from society 
are net zero on the global scale. Net zero implies 
that any remaining carbon dioxide emissions 
are simultaneously compensated by the same 
amount of carbon dioxide uptake (negative 
emissions) so that the net input of carbon 
dioxide to the atmosphere due to human 
activities is zero.
2. Almost all scenarios in the IPCC AR5 scenario 
database with a likely chance of limiting 
warming to below 2 °C reach carbon neutrality 
at some point in the second half of this century 
(Figure 2.4, panels a–d). 
____________________
16 Carbon dioxide emissions refers to the sum of carbon dioxide emissions from energy, industry, and land use/land cover change.
3. If emissions up to 2020 would be lower than 
in the least-cost 2020 scenarios, the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget would be used up 
less quickly, and the timing of carbon neutrality 
could be postponed by about 5–15 years. Hence, 
increasing ambition over the next few years 
would postpone by several years the difficult 
challenge of reaching net zero emissions.
4. In the scenario database from the IPCC, all least-
cost 2020 scenarios assume that net negative 
carbon dioxide emissions are needed at some 
point during this century to stay within the 
2 °C limit.  These scenarios further assume that 
carbon dioxide removal technologies such as 
bio-energy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS) will be implemented. The uncertainty 
around these technologies is discussed in 
 Box 2.3. The scenarios also indicate that the 
higher the emissions in the near term, the 
Box 2 .3: Negative emissions
Negative carbon dioxide emissions, the active removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, can be achieved 
by several means. These include afforestation or reforestation, carbon dioxide storage in combination with 
direct-air-capture, and BECCS (Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). BECCS is a measure that is applied often in model-
based studies because of its attractive costs and high potential.
However, the viability of large-scale BECCS deployment depends on overcoming some critical barriers. Fuss et al. 
(2014) identified four: 
1: physical and resource constraints (such as water availability), including the sustainability of large-scale 
deployment relative to other land- and biomass-related needs such as food security and biodiversity 
conservation, and the presence of safe, long term storage capacity for the captured carbon dioxide; 
2: the response of natural land and ocean carbon sinks to negative emissions; 
3: the costs and financing of an untested technology; and 
4: socio-institutional barriers, such as public acceptance of large-scale carbon capture and storage and large-
scale bioenergy production (UNEP, 2012; van Vuuren et al., 2013 ), and the related deployment policies.
Furthermore, the real-world availability of bioenergy is limited by many factors which are not fully represented 
in models (Creutzig et al., 2012) and current estimates from integrated assessment models of total mitigation 
potential vary greatly, sometimes by a factor of three (Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). Importantly, integrated 
assessment models also show that stringent climate targets can be achieved without BECCS (Riahi et al., 2012), or 
with just enough BECCS such that carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry are net zero.
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larger the negative emissions required later in 
the century to stay within the carbon dioxide 
emissions budget (Table 2.1).
5. Scenarios with higher emissions in the near 
term, least-cost 2020 scenarios, exhaust the 
carbon dioxide emissions budget more quickly 
than scenarios with lower emissions in the first 
few years of the scenario period (least-cost 2010 
scenarios). Therefore, scenarios with higher 
initial emissions must reduce their emissions 
more rapidly later to stay within the 2 °C limit 
and/or rely more strongly on negative emission 
technologies.
Data underlying these findings are provided in 
Table 2.1. Aiming for only a medium rather than 
likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit does 
not affect the above conclusions (Appendix 2-C).
To sum up, there is a trade-off between postponing 
near term emissions reductions and having to 
reduce emissions more rapidly and stringently 
later. The more that action is delayed in the near 
term and the greater the reliance on negative 
emissions later, the earlier the timing of net zero 
global total carbon dioxide emissions. 
Constraints on total greenhouse gas emissions 
for limiting warming to below 2 °C
The previous section describes the carbon dioxide 
emission budgets consistent with a 2 °C limit. 
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Figure 2 .4: Overview of global total carbon dioxide emissions (top row) and global total greenhouse gas 
emissions – the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol 
See Footnote 5 for a listing of these gases. The figure shows scenarios that assume limited emissions reductions until 2020 and 
least-cost emission pathways thereafter (least-cost 2020 scenarios panels a, b, e, and f ) and scenarios that assume least-cost 
emission pathways from 2010 onwards (least-cost 2010 scenarios panels c, d, g, and h). Scenarios with negative levels of global 
energy and industry-related carbon dioxide emissions are shown in panels a, c, e, and g, and without in panels b, d, f, and h. 
More details are provided in the text. For each case, the median (solid lines) and the 20th–80th percentile range (shaded areas) are 
provided. Additionally, for comparison, the range of scenarios included in Category 1 of the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment is shown 
in light blue shaded ranges in panels e-h.
15
EMISSIONS GAP REPORT   A UNEP Synthesis Chapter 2
What emission levels will comply with temperature limits?
Table 2 .1: Overview of global cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (CO2 emission budgets) between 
2015 and 2100 consistent with scenarios having a likely chance of limiting global temperature 
increase to 2 °C during the 21st century
“Likely” chance
(>66%)
Global carbon dioxide emissions budgets (Gt CO2)
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 19 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: 
2065 (2055-2070) 
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: 4 .6 (3 .4-6 .1) per cent per year
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile 358 396 -80 -325
median 370 506 48 -299
80th percentile*** 391 578 98 -148
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 0 (none) 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: no data
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: no data
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile No data No data No data No data
median No data No data No data No data
80th percentile*** No data No data No data No data
Optimal mitigation from 2010 onwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 58 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: 2070 (2060-
2075)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: 3 .1 (2 .5-4 .0) per cent per year
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile 296 455 -23 -259
median 340 542 110 -156
80th percentile*** 351 607 157 -85
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 23 
Year of annual net global CO
2
 (including LULUCF) emissions becoming zero*: 2080 (2075-
2095)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050**: 3 .3 (3 .0-3 .6) per cent per year
Time window 2015–2025 2025–2050 2050–2075 2075–2100
20th percentile 290 427 111 -95
median 312 506 142 -51
80th percentile*** 324 533 159  19
*  Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile).
**  Reduction rates are computed as compound annual growth rates.
*** As higher emissions in the near term have to be compensated by deeper reductions later, emitting 80th percentile budgets over the entire 
century would not result in a likely chance of limiting warming to below 2°C. 
Notes: Data refers to global total (energy, industry and LULUCF) carbon dioxide emissions. For results consistent with a “medium” 
(50–66 per cent) chance, see Appendix 2-C. A comparison of these results with IPCC AR5 WGIII data is provided in Appendix 2-D.
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Table 2 .2: Overview of global emissions of total greenhouse gases in 2020, 2025, 2030, 2050 and 
2100 consistent with scenarios with a likely (greater than 66 per cent) chance of limiting global 
temperature increase to below 2 °C during the 21st century, respectively
“Likely” chance
(>66%)
Annual emission of global total greehouse gases (Gt CO2e/yr)
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 18 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-greenhouse gas emissions becoming zero†: 2085 (2080-2100) 
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: 2 .8 (2 .4-3 .6) per cent per year
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 52 47 42 22 -3
range and spread** 49(50/53)55 39(40/48)50 29(30/44)44 17(18/25)29 -11(-10/0)0
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 0 (none) 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-greenhouse gas emissions becoming zero†: no data
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: no data
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* no data no data no data no data no data
range and spread** no data no data no data no data no data
Optimal mitigation from 2010 onwards
Scenarios relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 50 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-greenhouse gas emissions becoming zero†: 2095 (2090-after 2100)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: 2 .1 (1 .4-2 .6) per cent per year
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 46 43 40 24 -1
range and spread** 22(41/47)49 23(38/45)47 23(34/44)46 14(20/27)33 -10(-4/3)7
Scenarios NOT relying on  
net negative CO
2
 emissions  
from energy and industry 
during the 21st century
Number of available scenarios: 22 
Year of annual net global Kyoto-GHG emissions becoming zero†: after 2100 (after 2100-after 2100)
Average annual reduction rates from 2020 to 2050‡: 2 .1 (1 .9-2 .4) per cent per year
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 43 39 36 23 5
range and spread** 36(41/45)48 27(37/42)44 18(32/38)41 13(20/24)25 3(4/9)13
* Rounded to the nearest 1 Gt CO
2
e/yr.
** Rounded to the nearest 1 Gt CO
2
e/yr. Format: minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value. 
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile).
‡ Reduction rates are computed as compound annual growth rates.
Notes: Data refer to the sum of emissions of all greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (see footnote 5 for a listing of these gases). 
For results consistent with a “medium” (50–66 per cent) chance, see Appendix 2-C. A comparison of these results with IPCC AR5 WGIII data is 
provided in Appendix 2-D.
However, society produces not only carbon dioxide 
emissions but also substantial amounts of non-
carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions such as 
methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons, 
and these also make an important contribution 
____________________ 
17 See footnote 5 for a listing of these gases.
to global warming. Indeed, many of the scenarios 
from the IPCC scenario database take account of 
both carbon dioxide and the non-carbon dioxide 
gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol17. Hence, to get 
a more comprehensive picture of the emission 
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pathways consistent with climate targets we 
consider what total18 greenhouse gas emission 
pathways – carbon dioxide plus non-carbon 
dioxide – stay below the 2 °C limit. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of total 
greenhouse gas emissions scenarios that have a 
likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit:
1. More than half of the scenarios in the IPCC AR5 
scenario database that limit warming to below 
2 °C with a likely chance reach net zero global 
total greenhouse gas emissions in the second 
half of this century.  
2. All scenarios in the subset of least-cost 2020 
scenarios, which, as noted above, may be 
more consistent with the current pathway 
of emissions up to 2020, reach net zero total 
greenhouse gas emissions some time between 
2080 and 2100, or have nearly net zero total 
greenhouse gas emissions in 210019.
3. The timing of net zero global total emissions 
does not change much for the least cost 2010 
scenarios. In that case the timing of net zero 
emissions would only be pushed back by about 
10 years. 
4. Least-cost 2010 scenarios show a median 
emissions level of 44 Gt CO
2
e per year in 2020 
(range: 41–47).
5. Least-cost 2020 scenarios show a median 
emissions level of 52 Gt CO
2
e per year in 2020 
(range: 50–53). While this figure is much higher 
than in scenarios that begin stringent emission 
reductions in 2010 – least-cost 2010 scenarios 
– it is still exceeded by the expected level of 
emissions under almost all the pledge cases 
(Chapter 3).
6.  Looking further into the future, global emissions 
decline in all scenario groupings considered. In 
the least-cost 2020 scenarios, median global 
emissions of total greenhouse gases for 2025, 
2030 and 2050 are 47, 42, and 22 Gt CO
2
e per 
year respectively (Table 2.2).
____________________ 
18 Total greenhouse gas emissions is used here to mean the global emissions of the Kyoto gases as listed in Footnote 5. 
19 Four scenarios in this subset show total greenhouse gas emissions in 2100 which are below 0.25 Gt CO
2
e per year, but still above zero.
20 For example, van Vliet et al. (2012); Rogelj et al. (2013a,b); Riahi et al. (2013); Luderer et al., (2013a,b); Kriegler et al. (2014a) and the IPCC AR5 WGIII report 
(Clarke et al., 2014).
Constraints for limiting warming to below 1 .5 °C
Working Group III of the IPCC AR5 indicated that 
only a small number of studies have identified 
feasible total greenhouse gas emission pathways 
that are consistent with staying below a 1.5 °C limit 
up to 2100 with at least a 50 per cent chance. This 
small group of studies agree that staying within 
1.5 °C requires: 
1: immediate and strong mitigation action; 
2: the rapid upscaling of the full portfolio of 
mitigation technologies; and 
3: development along a low-energy demand 
trajectory (IPCC, 2014). 
Within these studies, only a small number of 
scenarios meet the 1.5 oC target with at least a 
50 per cent chance, and have least-cost pathways 
beginning in 2010. Emission levels in one set 
of these scenarios are 37–41 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, 
27–31 Gt CO
2
e in 2030, and 13–17 Gt CO
2
e in 2050 
(Rogelj et al., 2013b). Emissions levels in another 
set are 39–43 Gt CO
2
e in 2020, 27–35 in 2030, and 
6–10 Gt CO
2
e in 2050 (Luderer et al., 2013b). 
An even smaller number of scenarios meet the 1.5 oC 
target with at least a 50 per cent chance and have 
least-cost emissions pathways beginning in 2020 
– and therefore, have higher emissions up to 2020. 
2 .3 .4 Implications of later action
As noted above, recent trends in global emissions 
imply that the world is not following a least-cost 
pathway of early mitigation action for limiting 
global temperature increase to either 1.5 °C or 2 °C 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2014). An obvious advantage 
of delaying mitigation action is that costs are not 
incurred today. On the other hand, many recent 
studies20, including the IPCC AR5, have shown 
that delaying mitigation actions will intensify 
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the challenges to limit global warming to 1.5 °C 
or 2 °C21. In general, IPCC AR5 found (with high 
confidence) that postponing further mitigation 
efforts to 2030 beyond current country pledges 
would substantially hinder the transition to lower 
long-term emissions levels and highlights that this 
postponement would narrow the range of options 
for staying within the 2 °C limit with a likely chance. 
The IPCC highlighted that many models were 
unable to produce scenarios that keep warming to 
below 2 °C with about 50 per cent chance, when 
starting from emissions in 2030 that are greater
than 55 Gt CO
2
e.
Higher near term emission levels require very 
fast medium term emission reductions
Delaying mitigation action and allowing higher 
emission levels in the near term means that faster 
emission reductions are required later to stay 
within the same carbon dioxide emissions budget. 
For example, scenarios that delay stringent action 
until 2020 (least-cost 2020 scenarios) reduce their 
carbon dioxide emissions by around 4.6 per cent 
per year22 after 2020 as compared to scenarios with 
earlier action (least-cost 2010 scenarios) which 
fall by 3.1–3.3 per cent per year during the same 
period (Table 2.1). Furthermore, the IPCC showed 
that scenarios with stringent mitigation delayed 
until 2030 required twice as rapid a reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions after 2030 as compared 
to those that had begun stringent reductions in 
2010 – for the case of staying within the 2 °C limit 
(IPCC, 2014). In addition, the AMPERE study found 
that scenarios with modest emission reductions 
until 2030 used up about 70 per cent of the carbon 
dioxide emissions budget consistent with the 2 °C 
limit by that date (Bertram et al., 2013; Riahi et al., 
2013). Furthermore, it was noted that immediate 
and stringent emission reductions are essential 
in scenarios that stay below the 1.5 °C limit by 
2100 (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a; 
IPCC, 2014).
Delay in mitigation causes lock-in of carbon 
intensive infrastructure
Scenarios with limited near term action have fewer 
options for reducing emissions if concerted action 
is delayed until after 2020 or 2030. This is because 
of carbon lock-in – the continued construction 
of high-emissions fossil-fuel infrastructure 
unconstrained by climate policies (Bertram et al., 
2013; Luderer et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013a; 
Johnson et al., 2014). Unless comprehensive and 
ambitious climate policies are put into place, the 
world will continue to expand its carbon- and 
energy-intensive infrastructure, and will not 
sufficiently incentivize the development and scale-
up of climate-friendly technologies. As an example, 
the capacity of coal-fired power plants grows by 50 
per cent by 2030, relative to current levels, under 
some later action scenarios in the AMPERE study 
(Bertram et al., 2013). 
Other studies have shown that a large fraction 
of carbon-intensive infrastructure, particularly 
coal power plants, will need to be shut down 
prematurely if the 2 °C target is to be achieved 
(Johnson et al., 2014) – an example of stranded 
assets. Delaying stringent reductions until 2030 
will result in such stranded assets in the order of 
hundreds of billions of dollars (Bertram et al., 2013; 
Johnson et al., 2014). For example, a recent study 
(Johnson et al., 2014) estimates that, over the 
period 2011−2050, global investments associated 
with stranded coal-fired power plant capacity could 
more than triple (from US$ 165 to US$ 550 billion) 
if stringent mitigation is not achieved by 2030 
(and the 2 °C target is met through later, drastic 
mitigation efforts). This happens because weak 
restrictions on emissions over the next few years 
are assumed to encourage/allow the expansion of 
conventional coal-fired power plants. As a result, a 
larger number of coal-fired power plants might be 
faced with stringent emission restrictions later and 
be forced to close before the end of their usual life. 
____________________ 
21  These paragraphs update the discussion of this topic in UNEP (2013) .
22  Emission reduction rates are typically computed as compound annual growth rates. However, such an approach cannot deal with emissions becoming negative 
at some point during the assessed time period.
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The same lock-in effect applies to lost 
opportunities for energy efficiency (Chapter 4). 
The Global Energy Assessment (GEA23; Riahi et al.,
2012) shows the critical importance of energy 
efficiency measures for limiting warming to below 
2 °C, and similar findings are valid for returning 
warming to below 1.5 °C (Luderer et al., 2013b; 
Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). Later-
action scenarios tend to further lock-in power 
plants, buildings and other infrastructure with low 
levels of energy efficiency. This makes the transition 
to a high-energy-efficiency future more difficult, 
and puts a greater burden on alternative emission 
reduction measures.  
Delay in mitigation can slow the 
transformation of the energy system
Recent research has shown that the share of zero- 
and low-carbon energy sources24 in the world’s 
energy economy has to substantially increase 
in order to stay within atmospheric levels of 
greenhouse gases consistent with the 2 °C limit. 
One estimate is that a 3–4-fold increase is needed 
between 2010 and 2050 (Riahi et al., 2013; IPCC, 
2014). The question is how fast this growth has 
to take place. On one hand, least-cost scenarios, 
beginning in 2010, achieve this share through a 
smooth transition and roughly a doubling of the 
low-carbon energy share every 20 years. On the 
other hand, scenarios delaying action until later 
need to achieve this objective at a much faster 
pace. For example, scenarios with delays up to 
2030, need to scale up the low-carbon share of 
the energy economy at twice the pace of least-
cost scenarios beginning in 2010 (Riahi et al., 2013; 
IPCC, 2014). Moreover, the lack of near term climate 
policies is also assumed to hinder the scaling up of 
low-emission, green-energy technologies (Eom et 
al., 2013), and hinder technological learning and 
development as well.
Early policy signals are needed to plan for 
later action
Even if near term mitigation actions are delayed, it 
is important to begin sending strong and reliable 
policy signals to industry, municipalities and 
other sectors of society that stringent emissions 
reductions will be necessary over the medium 
term – for example, laws or regulations that call 
for specific emission reductions or ceilings at some 
future date. Without clear signals, industry will 
lock-in carbon- and energy-intensive infrastructure 
as explained above.
Delay in mitigation leads to higher overall 
costs and economic challenges
Scenarios with later action have lower mitigation 
costs in the near term and this implies a lower 
burden on current economic growth but larger 
overall mitigation costs. These scenarios also have 
larger economic challenges during the transition 
towards a comprehensive climate policy regime, 
including substantial impacts on global economic 
growth and energy prices (Clarke et al., 2009; Jakob 
et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; Kriegler et al., 2014a; 
Luderer et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et 
al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Clarke et al., 2014). The longer the delay, the higher 
costs become. The IPCC indicates that delaying 
stringent reductions to 2030 would increase 
mitigation costs during the period 2030–2050 by 
around 40 per cent compared to scenarios without 
delays (Clarke et al., 2014). The cost penalty of later 
action depends on: 
1: when comprehensive mitigation actions finally 
begin; 
2: the magnitude of emission reductions up to 
that point; and 
3: the future availability of technologies. 
Furthermore, delaying emission reductions in the 
near term shifts the burden of mitigation costs 
____________________ 
23 The full report is available at: http://www.globalenergyassessment.org/
24 Renewables, nuclear energy, fossil fuel energy with carbon capture and storage, or biofuels with carbon capture and storage.
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to later generations (OECD, 2012; Luderer et al., 
2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Clarke et al., 2014).
Finally, later-action scenarios also have higher 
economic costs, exclusive of mitigation costs, 
during the transition from modest early action to 
later more comprehensive action (Kriegler et al., 
2014a; Luderer et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2013b). 
These transitional costs increase strongly with 
further delay. 
Delay in mitigation reduces societal choices
The more emission reductions are delayed, the 
greater society’s dependence on future unproven 
technologies25, reducing its options and choices for 
the future (Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; 
Rogelj et al., 2013a). Many later-action scenarios 
assume that the full portfolio of mitigation options 
represented in the models is available, including 
unproven negative emissions technologies such 
as BECCS (Box 2.3). However, costs will increase if 
it turns out that anticipated technologies are not 
available, because of technology failure or because 
society chooses not to deploy them (Kriegler et al., 
2014b; Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Clarke et al., 2014). 
Delay in mitigation leads to higher climate risks
Scenarios with later action increase the risks of 
climate impacts in the following ways: 
First, the risk of temporarily exceeding climate 
limits is higher because of higher initial emission 
levels (Clarke et al., 2009; den Elzen et al., 2010; van 
Vliet et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2013; Luderer et al., 
2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Schaeffer et al., 2013). 
Overshooting temperature limits, or prolonging 
the overshoot period, implies a greater risk of 
large-scale and possibly irreversible changes in 
the climate system – see Lenton et al. (2008) for 
examples of such changes. The extent to which 
such overshooting increases the risk of these 
impacts is very uncertain.
Second, the pace of temperature increase in the 
near to medium term is higher (den Elzen et al., 
2010; van Vliet et al., 2012; Schaeffer et al., 2013) 
and this can imply more rapid climate impacts and 
require quicker adaptation. For example, based 
on results from 11 integrated assessment models, 
Schaeffer et al. (2013) found that later-action 
scenarios meeting the 2 °C limit have, on average, 
a 50 per cent higher rate of decadal temperature 
increase in the 2040s compared with least-cost 
scenarios beginning in 2010 – 0.3 °C instead of 
0.2 °C per decade.
Third, postponing stringent mitigation increases 
the risk of exhausting carbon dioxide emission 
budgets. The risk comes from the fact that the 
steep reductions required to compensate for 
higher near-term emissions may not materialise. 
This may happen because of unanticipated 
technology failures (Riahi et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 
2014) or the unwillingness of future policymakers 
to take on the required high costs of mitigation.
Fourth, when action is delayed, various options to 
achieve stringent levels of climate protection are 
increasingly lost (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 
2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). One sign of this is that 
a declining number of models are able to identify 
feasible emission pathways that stay within a 1.5 °C 
or 2 °C limit with increasing delays (IPCC, 2014).
Delay in mitigation forgoes co-benefits
The IPCC AR5 WGIII report (IPCC, 2014) identified 
a large number of co-benefits of greenhouse gas 
mitigation, such as reduced costs for achieving 
air quality and energy security objectives, 
improved human health, reduced crop yield 
losses, and lower adverse impacts on ecosystems. 
Delaying mitigation action also implies that 
these co-benefits will be forgone while emissions 
remain high.____________________ 
25 As an example of technological dependency, it was found that only two out of nine models in the AMPERE study could reach a long-term 450 parts per million 
(ppm) carbon dioxide concentration target (and therefore could comply with the 2 °C target) without scaling up carbon capture and storage (Riahi et al., 2013). A 
similar dependency is found for other mitigation technologies (ibid, Rogelj et al., 2013b).
